Skip to content

47-Day Certificates Are Coming. Are You Ready?

Act Now →

Time Stamping Code Signing Certificates – Significance

Time Stamping Code Signing Certs

Introduction

Let’s briefly discuss Code signing.

Code signing is a method of putting a digital signature on a file, document, software, or executable to test its authenticity and genuineness in regards to the functionality and features that it provides. This also ensures that the software entity (file, document, software, or executable) is not tampered with while in transit.
Code signing has become a quintessential requirement for software developers, The reason is code signing ensures a trust among users for the software, and also provides confidence to users to avoid the warning messages which appear when a user downloads/installs the executable in their environment.

Quick Answer: What Is Time Stamping in Code Signing?

Time stamping is an optional step in code signing where a Time Stamp Authority (TSA) cryptographically records the exact time a code signing certificate signed a file. Because the signature’s validity is then verified against that recorded time rather than the current system clock, signed software keeps installing correctly even after the code signing certificate expires or is revoked.

Last updated: August 2026 · Last verified: August 2026 · Recommended refresh cadence: 6 months, since this is an evergreen explainer of a stable code signing concept.

Executive Summary

  • Time stamping decouples signature validity from certificate validity: a client checks the signature against the recorded signing time, not the current date, so an expired or revoked certificate doesn’t invalidate software signed while it was still valid.
  • A Time Stamp Authority (TSA) does the work: it uses PKI to bind a hash of the software and the current authoritative time into a signed timestamp token that gets embedded in the code signature.
  • Two protocol families dominate: RFC 3161 (updated by RFC 5035) and Microsoft Authenticode, used across .cab, .exe, .ocx, and .dll formats.
  • Skipping it has a real cost: without a timestamp, software becomes unable to install once its signing certificate expires, creating exactly the kind of certificate-related disruption that a large share of enterprises already report experiencing.

Who Should Care About Code Signing Time Stamping

Time stamping is a signing-pipeline decision that outlives any single release. Here’s what each role should own.

PKI Administrators

Confirm the signing tool’s timestamp option is enabled by default and that the configured TSA endpoint is reachable and monitored.

Security Architects

Choose which timestamping protocol (RFC 3161 or Authenticode) fits the organization’s signing toolchain and target file formats, and document the decision in the code signing policy.

Platform Teams

Wire timestamping into the CI/CD signing step so every build is time stamped automatically, with no manual flag a developer can forget.

Compliance Teams

Confirm timestamping practices and TSA usage are documented and distributed to every stakeholder involved in the code signing process, as the original best practices below recommend.

CISOs

Own the decision to revoke a compromised code signing certificate without hesitation, knowing time stamped software already in the field will keep validating correctly.

Why This Matters: Data and Deadlines

According to DigiCert’s Trust Pulse survey (published July 2, 2025), nearly half of enterprises experienced a certificate-related outage in the past year, and 37.5% of those outages were caused specifically by expired certificates. An unsigned or improperly time stamped code signing certificate that expires or is revoked creates exactly this failure mode: previously working software suddenly fails to install or run.

The CA/Browser Forum’s Ballot SC-081v3 (approved April 11, 2025) shortens maximum TLS certificate validity to 200 days starting March 15, 2026, 100 days starting March 15, 2027, and 47 days starting March 15, 2029. While this ballot targets TLS certificates specifically, it reflects an industry-wide move toward shorter certificate lifetimes, which makes time stamping every signed artifact more important, not less, since certificates covering any given piece of signed software will now churn faster.

On the algorithm side, NIST finalized its first three post-quantum standards, FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), on August 13, 2024. As code signing keys and TSA infrastructure eventually migrate to post-quantum algorithms, organizations with disciplined timestamping practices already in place will have an easier transition than those retrofitting the process during a migration.

Glossary: Key Terms

TermDefinition
Code signingThe practice of applying a digital signature to a file, document, or executable to prove its authenticity and confirm it hasn’t been tampered with in transit.
Time stampingAn optional code signing step where a TSA records the exact signing time so a client can verify the signature against that time instead of the current date.
Time Stamp Authority (TSA)A trusted PKI-based service that combines a software hash with authoritative time data, signs it with its own private key, and returns a timestamp token to the requester.
RFC 3161The original IETF standard defining the time-stamp protocol used in code signing; updated and superseded by RFC 5035, which adds support for ESSCertIDv2.
Microsoft AuthenticodeMicrosoft’s code signing and timestamping format, used across .cab, .exe, .ocx, and .dll files on Windows.
Certificate revocationThe act of invalidating a certificate before its expiration date, typically due to private key compromise; time stamped software signed before revocation continues to validate correctly.

What is Time Stamping?

Time stamping is an optional part of the code signing process, which allows software to recognize whether an applied code signing signature is valid–even after a code signing certificate expires. In other words, we can say that time stamping preserves the signature applied to the software.
Whenever the signed software’s executable is run/executed on any client machine/system, its digital signature is verified by the user’s operating system. Now, suppose the user has time stamped the software. The users’ computer will verify the signature based on the time it was digitally signed, rather than the current time of the system when the software is executed.

Below is the work flow for a time stamping process:

workflow of time stamping process

Time Stamping is provided by the Time Stamp Authority (TSA) which uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) principles and technology for applying timestamps.

Enterprise Code-Signing Solution

Get One solution for all your software code-signing cryptographic needs with our code-signing solution.

The following steps are performed to Time Stamp software:

  1. A hashed value is created and sent to the TSA by the requester for the software that needs to be time stamped.
  2. Hash value, authoritative time and other related information such as data and time of the digital signature are combined by the TSA and signed by its private key to create a new hash value.
  3. Next, the new hash and the software’s hash is bundled up and sent to the requester.
  4. A requester’s application then receives the bundle and verifies it. Once the verification is done, the time stamp becomes valid and embedded within the code signature of the software.

Let’s try to understand this in terms of a real-world scenario.
Let’s assume that you are the developer, you did the code signing of your software, and the certificate is valid from January 2021 to till January 2022. Now, a user who downloads your software on October 2021 forgets to install it due to his busy schedule. He tries to install the software in February 2022, but he gets an error.

Let’s understand the same scenario with the only exception that you have time stamped the software in July 2021. Now, when the user tries to install the software in February 2022, he is able to install it and doesn’t get any error at all. This is the effect of Time Stamping!!

Protocols used in Time Stamping

The following protocols are used in Time Stamping software:

RFC 3161

RFC 3161 is updated and designated as RFC 5035 which additionally allows the use of ESSCertIDv2.

Microsoft Authenticode

Microsoft Authenticode can be utilized in various formats such as .cab, .exe, .ocx, and .dll

Code Sign Time Stamping best practices

The following best practices can be adapted while Code sign Time Stamping is done:

  1. Always make sure that the time stamping option is enabled in your signing tool, such as Microsoft Signtool. Also, choose a signing tool which supports the time stamping option as it’s an optional feature by default.
  2. Ensure that time stamping is included as part of your software development lifecycle process. This will avoid any unexpected issues occurring due to version mismatches.
  3. Document the complete process for your signing tool while using the time stamping option, as every sign tool has a different workflow for time stamping. Also, distribute this document to every stakeholder involved in the code signing process.
  4. Time stamping allows the client system to verify if the software was signed before or after the revocation of the code signing certificate. So, if you want to revoke the code signing certificate for any reason, such as private key compromise, you may do so. The client system will not have any difficulty while installing the software, as time stamping was done when the code signing certificate was valid.

Practical Checklist Before You Ship a Signed Build

  • Confirm the signing tool (Signtool or equivalent) has the timestamp flag enabled and pointed at a working TSA URL.
  • Verify the timestamp token embeds correctly by inspecting the signed binary’s certificate details for a timestamp counter-signature.
  • Automate timestamping in the CI/CD pipeline so it happens on every build, not as a manual, skippable step.
  • Document the timestamping workflow for each signing tool in use and share it with every stakeholder in the signing process.
  • Test that older, already-shipped builds still install correctly after their signing certificate expires, confirming the timestamp is doing its job.
  • Re-verify TSA endpoint availability and certificate validity on the recommended refresh cadence.

Issue, Impact, and Ownership Table

IssueBusiness ImpactRecommended ActionOwner
Timestamping option left disabled in the signing toolSoftware silently stops installing once the signing certificate expires, generating support tickets and lost trustEnable timestamping by default in the signing tool configuration and verify on every releasePlatform Team
No TSA endpoint monitoringBuilds fail to sign or ship without a timestamp if the TSA is unreachable during a release windowMonitor TSA endpoint availability and configure a fallback TSA where supportedPKI Administrator
Timestamping process undocumentedNew team members or new signing tools skip timestamping, reintroducing the original riskDocument the timestamping workflow per signing tool and distribute to all stakeholdersSecurity Architect
Certificate revoked without confirming prior timestampsUncertainty over whether already-shipped software will keep validating after revocationConfirm affected builds were time stamped before revoking a compromised certificateCISO
No periodic audit of signing/timestamping practiceConfiguration drift goes unnoticed until an expired certificate breaks installationsAudit signing tool configuration and TSA usage on the recommended refresh cadenceCompliance Team

Certificate Lifecycle Management and PKI Modernization

Code signing certificates are subject to the same certificate lifecycle management discipline as any other certificate type: issuance, renewal, and revocation all need to be tracked, and timestamping is what keeps revocation from breaking already-shipped software. CertSecure Manager centralizes certificate automation, including code signing certificate lifecycle tracking, so expiring signing certificates don’t catch a release pipeline off guard. Organizations modernizing their PKI or moving certificate issuance to the cloud should also evaluate PKI-as-a-Service for PKI modernization with signing and timestamping infrastructure built in.

Because signing keys and algorithms will eventually need to migrate for crypto agility, pair timestamping discipline with a broader inventory: the PQC Center of Excellence offers hands-on post-quantum testing, and a PQC readiness assessment can identify which signing certificates and keys will need attention first. Pair both with CBOM Secure for ongoing certificate discovery and machine identity inventory across every code signing key in use.

For more on the surrounding lifecycle, see What Are the Stages in a Certificate Lifecycle? and How to Avoid Certificate Outages.

Measuring Success and Ongoing Audits

Success looks like every signed build carrying a valid timestamp by default, zero installation failures traced back to an expired signing certificate, a documented timestamping workflow every stakeholder can reference, and a TSA endpoint that’s monitored rather than assumed to be up.

Re-audit the signing tool configuration, TSA endpoint reachability, and this documentation on a 6-month cadence, since this is an evergreen explainer of a stable process rather than a policy tied to a specific vendor deadline.

Conclusion

Time stamping appears to be an optional step, whereas it is a vital component of the code signing ecosystem in your organization. Without time stamping, expiration/revocation of code signing certificates would lessen the confidence of customers in the same software product. Timestamps make sure that even if certificates lose their validity or are revoked for some reason, their signatures remain valid, secure and trusted.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the main takeaway from Time Stamping Code Signing Certificates – Significance?

The main takeaway is that time stamping decouples a signature’s validity from the code signing certificate’s validity: a client verifies the signature against the recorded signing time, so previously signed software keeps installing correctly even after the certificate expires or is revoked.

Why does this matter for enterprise PKI teams?

Enterprise PKI teams manage code signing certificates alongside every other certificate type, and an un-time-stamped signing certificate turns a routine renewal or revocation into a software distribution outage, since already-shipped builds stop installing the moment the certificate expires.

What risks increase if this topic is handled manually?

Handling timestamping manually increases the risk that a developer forgets to enable the timestamp flag on a given build, that different signing tools follow inconsistent undocumented workflows, and that nobody notices a missing timestamp until an old build starts failing to install.

Which teams should own this change?

PKI administrators confirm the signing tool and TSA are configured correctly; security architects choose and document the timestamping protocol; platform teams automate it into CI/CD; compliance teams keep the process documented and distributed; and CISOs own the decision to revoke certificates knowing time stamped software stays valid.

How does this connect to certificate lifecycle management?

Time stamping is a certificate lifecycle management concern because it determines whether a code signing certificate’s expiration or revocation, both normal lifecycle events, actually breaks previously signed software or not.

How should organizations measure success?

Success looks like every signed build carrying a valid timestamp by default, zero installation failures traced to an expired signing certificate, and a documented timestamping workflow that every stakeholder can reference.

What should be audited or monitored regularly?

Organizations should monitor TSA endpoint availability continuously and audit the signing tool’s timestamp configuration and documentation on a 6-month cadence to catch configuration drift before it causes an installation failure.

How does this topic affect cloud, hybrid, or multi-CA PKI?

In multi-CA or hybrid environments, each signing pipeline and each CA issuing code signing certificates needs its own confirmed timestamping configuration, since a TSA setting that works for one signing tool or CI system doesn’t automatically apply to another.

What common mistakes should teams avoid?

Common mistakes include leaving the timestamp option off because it’s optional by default, skipping documentation of the timestamping workflow, not automating it into the build pipeline, and assuming a certificate can’t be safely revoked without checking whether prior builds were time stamped.

What should be refreshed quarterly?

Because this is an evergreen explainer rather than a policy tied to a shifting deadline, a 6-month refresh cadence is recommended for reviewing the signing tool configuration, TSA endpoint reachability, and this documentation, rather than a quarterly one.