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How to Build a Two-Tier Post-Quantum PKI with ML-DSA on EJBCA Community 9.3

Post-Quantum PKI hierarchy in EJBCA with an ML-DSA-87 Root CA and Issuing CA

This guide builds on our previous guide to setting up EJBCA Community Edition 9.3.7 on Ubuntu 26.04. On the same server, you set up a two-tier post-quantum PKI in which the Root CA and the Issuing CA both sign with ML-DSA-87, the post-quantum signature algorithm standardised in FIPS 204. You then issue an ML-DSA-87 TLS server certificate and verify it with OpenSSL, including its chain, CRLs and OCSP responses.

EJBCA Community Edition supports ML-DSA keys only in software (soft) crypto tokens. HSM-backed ML-DSA keys aren’t supported in Community Edition, so all CA keys in this guide stay in soft tokens.

The two-tier PKI architecture

A two-tier PKI separates the CA that relying parties trust from the CA that issues certificates day to day.

  • The Root CA is the trust anchor. Its certificate is self-signed and is the only certificate that relying parties need to trust. It signs only the certificates of the CAs below it, their revocation status, and its own CRL.
  • The Issuing CA is signed by the Root CA. It issues certificates to end entities such as servers, users and devices, publishes their revocation status in its CRL, and answers OCSP queries about them.

In production, the Root CA runs on a standalone machine that stays offline and isn’t joined to any domain. It’s brought online only to sign an Issuing CA certificate or a new CRL.

Tier 1: Root CATier 2: Issuing CA
Name in this guidePQC-RootCA-G1PQC-IssuingCA-G1
Signed byItselfThe Root CA
SignsIssuing CA certificates, its CRL, and OCSP responses about the Issuing CAEnd-entity certificates, its CRL, and OCSP responses about end entities
Validity30 years15 years
New CRLEvery 6 monthsDaily
In productionOfflineOnline

Before you start

Prerequisites

  • Part 1 of the previous guide (Steps 1 to 5) completed: EJBCA Community 9.3.7 on Ubuntu 26.04, with AdminWeb opening at https://ejbca-lab.test:8443/ejbca/adminweb/ as SuperAdmin. Part 2 (the HSM integration) isn’t needed.
  • A browser on the Ubuntu server with the SuperAdmin certificate imported (step 5.2 of the previous guide). RA Web uses the same certificate.
  • A terminal on the Ubuntu server with OpenSSL 3.5 or later. The CRL and OCSP URLs resolve only on this server.

Names used in this guide

ItemName
Working folder~/pqc-lab
Root CA crypto tokenPQC-RootCA-Token
Issuing CA crypto tokenPQC-IssuingCA-Token
Root CA certificate profilePQC-RootCA-MLDSA87
Issuing CA certificate profilePQC-IssuingCA-MLDSA87
TLS server certificate profilePQC-TLSServer-MLDSA87
End entity profilePQC-TLSServer-EEP
Root CAPQC-RootCA-G1, subject CN=PQC Root CA G1,O=PKI Lab
Issuing CAPQC-IssuingCA-G1, subject CN=PQC Issuing CA G1,O=PKI Lab
TLS server certificatepqc-web.ejbca-lab.test

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Step 1: Create the crypto tokens and ML-DSA-87 keys

Each CA gets its own soft crypto token with three keys. Steps 3 and 4 map them to the CA’s key purposes:

Key aliasAlgorithmMapped toPurpose
rootSignKey0001 / issuingSignKey0001ML-DSA-87certSignKeySigns certificates, CRLs and OCSP responses
rootDefaultKey0001 / issuingDefaultKey0001RSA 4096defaultKey, keyEncryptKeyThe CA’s default key, used for internal encryption such as key recovery. ML-DSA can only sign, so this key must be RSA.
testKeyML-DSA-87testKeyLets EJBCA’s health check confirm that the token works

1.1 Create the Root CA crypto token

  1. In AdminWeb, go to CA Functions → Crypto Tokens and click Create new….
  2. Fill in the form:
    • Name: PQC-RootCA-Token
    • Type: Soft
    • Auto-activation: tick Use.
    • Allow export of private keys: leave unticked.
    • Authentication Code and Repeat Authentication Code: a strong code. Save it in your password manager; you need it to reactivate or edit the token.
  3. Click Save.
Create the Root CA crypto token

Generate the three keys from the row at the bottom of the token’s page, in this order:

  1. Name rootSignKey0001, specification ML-DSA-87, then click Generate new key pair.
  2. Name rootDefaultKey0001, specification RSA 4096, then click Generate new key pair.
  3. Name testKey, specification ML-DSA-87, then click Generate new key pair.
Create the Root CA crypto token

1.2 Create the Issuing CA crypto token

Repeat 1.1 with the Issuing CA’s values:

  • Name: PQC-IssuingCA-Token, Type: Soft, Auto-activation: ticked
  • Authentication Code: a new code, different from the Root CA token’s. Save it in your password manager.
  • Keys: issuingSignKey0001 (ML-DSA-87), issuingDefaultKey0001 (RSA 4096) and testKey (ML-DSA-87)
Create the Issuing CA crypto token

CA Functions → Crypto Tokens now lists both PQC tokens as active, alongside the ManagementCA token:

CA Functions → Crypto Tokens now lists both PQC tokens as active, alongside the ManagementCA token

Step 2: Create the certificate profiles

Create one certificate profile for each CA and one for the TLS server certificate, each cloned from a built-in template.

2.1 Root CA profile

  1. Go to CA Functions → Certificate Profiles, click Clone next to ROOTCA, enter PQC-RootCA-MLDSA87 and click Create from template. Then click Edit next to the new profile.
  2. Available Key Algorithms: select ML-DSA-87 only. To deselect any other highlighted algorithm, hold Ctrl and click it. The Available ECDSA curves and Available Bit Lengths boxes then have nothing to select, which is expected.
Root CA profile
  1. Signature Algorithm: leave Inherit from issuing CA, and leave Alternative Signature unticked. Set Validity or end date of the certificate to 30y.
Root CA profile
  1. X.509v3 extensions:
    • Basic Constraints: keep Use… and Critical ticked. Leave Path Length Constraint unticked.
    • Key Usage: tick Use… and Critical, then select Digital Signature, Key certificate sign and CRL sign, and nothing else.
    • Extended Key Usage and Certificate Policies: leave unticked.
Root CA profile
  1. X.509v3 extensions – Validation data: leave CRL Distribution Points and Authority Information Access unticked.
  2. Other Data: clear Use next to LDAP DN order, then click Save at the bottom of the page.

2.2 Issuing CA profile

  1. In CA Functions → Certificate Profiles, click Clone next to SUBCA, enter PQC-IssuingCA-MLDSA87, click Create from template, then click Edit.
  2. Available Key Algorithms: ML-DSA-87 only, as in 2.1.
  3. Signature Algorithm: leave Inherit from issuing CA. Set Validity or end date of the certificate to 15y.
Issuing CA profile
Issuing CA profile
  1. X.509v3 extensions:
    • Basic Constraints: keep Use… and Critical ticked. Tick Add… next to Path Length Constraint and leave the value at 0.
    • Key Usage: tick Use… and Critical, then select Digital Signature, Key certificate sign and CRL sign.
Issuing CA profile
  1. X.509v3 extensions – Validation data:
    • Tick Use next to CRL Distribution Points, then tick Use CA defined CRL Distribution Point.
    • Tick Use next to Authority Information Access, then tick Use CA defined OCSP locator and Use CA defined CA issuer.
Issuing CA profile
  1. Other Data: clear Use next to LDAP DN order, then click Save.

2.3 TLS server profile

  1. In CA Functions → Certificate Profiles, click Clone next to SERVER, enter PQC-TLSServer-MLDSA87, click Create from template, then click Edit.
  2. Available Key Algorithms: ML-DSA-87 only.
  3. Signature Algorithm: leave Inherit from issuing CA. Set Validity or end date of the certificate to 1y.
  4. X.509v3 extensions:
    • Key Usage: tick Use… and Critical, select Digital Signature, and clear Key encipherment. ML-DSA keys can’t encrypt, so RFC 9881 doesn’t allow Key Encipherment on an ML-DSA certificate.
    • Extended Key Usage: keep Server Authentication selected.
TLS server profile
  1. X.509v3 extensions – Names: keep Subject Alternative Name (Use and Search Enabled) ticked, and clear Issuer Alternative Name.
  2. X.509v3 extensions – Validation data: as in 2.2, tick CRL Distribution Points with Use CA defined CRL Distribution Point, and Authority Information Access with Use CA defined OCSP locator and Use CA defined CA issuer.
  3. Other Data: clear Use next to LDAP DN order, then click Save.

CA Functions → Certificate Profiles now lists the three PQC profiles alongside the built-in ones:

CA Functions → Certificate Profiles now lists the three PQC profiles alongside the built-in ones

Step 3: Create the Root CA

Steps 3.1 to 3.5 fill in the Create CA page from top to bottom. Click Create only in 3.6.

3.1 Create a new CA

In AdminWeb, go to CA Functions → Certification Authorities. In the Add CA field, enter PQC-RootCA-G1 and click Create….

Create a new CA

3.2 Choose the token, algorithm and keys

FieldValue
CA TypeX509
Crypto TokenPQC-RootCA-Token
Signing AlgorithmML-DSA-87
defaultKeyrootDefaultKey0001
certSignKeyrootSignKey0001
keyEncryptKeyrootDefaultKey0001
testKeytestKey
Alternative Signing AlgorithmLeave empty

Make sure defaultKey and keyEncryptKey point to the RSA key.

Choose the token, algorithm and keys

3.3 Fill in the CA certificate data

FieldValue
Subject DNCN=PQC Root CA G1,O=PKI Lab
Signed BySelf Signed
Certificate ProfilePQC-RootCA-MLDSA87
Validity30y
LDAP DN orderClear Use
Fill in the CA certificate data

3.4 Set the CRL periods

FieldValue
CRL Expire Period1y
CRL Issue Interval6mo
CRL Overlap Time0m
Delta CRL Period0m (default)
Generate CRL Upon RevocationLeave unticked
Set the CRL periods

Note: For hardware identity certificates under DICE and SPDM, the expiry should be 99991231235959Z.

3.5 Set the validation URLs

In the Default CA defined validation data section, fill in three fields:

  • Default CRL Distribution Point: click Generate.
  • OCSP service Default URI: click Generate.
  • CA issuer Default URI: there’s no Generate button, so build it from the CRL URL:
    • Copy the whole Default CRL Distribution Point value (Ctrl+A, Ctrl+C) and paste it into CA issuer Default URI.
    • Change cmd=crl to cmd=iecacert.
    • Add &level=0 to the end.

The three fields then read like this:

FieldURL
Default CRL Distribution Pointhttp://ejbca-lab.test:8080/ejbca/publicweb/webdist/certdist?cmd=crl&issuer=CN%3DPQC+Root+CA+G1%2C+O%3DPKI+Lab
OCSP service Default URIhttp://ejbca-lab.test:8080/ejbca/publicweb/status/ocsp
CA issuer Default URIhttp://ejbca-lab.test:8080/ejbca/publicweb/webdist/certdist?cmd=iecacert&issuer=CN%3DPQC+Root+CA+G1%2C+O%3DPKI+Lab&level=0

If a URL shows localhost instead of ejbca-lab.test, replace the host by hand.

Note: These URLs point at EJBCA’s built-in public endpoints. If your organisation hosts its own CRL distribution point, OCSP responder or CA certificate repository, enter those URLs in the three fields instead. Each endpoint must serve this CA’s data: its CRL, its OCSP responses, or its DER-encoded CA certificate.

Set the validation URLs

3.6 Create the CA

Click Create at the bottom of the page. PQC-RootCA-G1 appears in the Certification Authorities list with the status Active:

PQC-RootCA-G1 appears in the Certification Authorities list with the status Active

To view the new certificate, go to CA Functions → CA Structure & CRLs and click View Certificate under PQC-RootCA-G1. The issuer and subject are both CN=PQC Root CA G1,O=PKI Lab, and the public key and signature algorithm are both ML-DSA-87:

The issuer and subject are both CN=PQC Root CA G1,O=PKI Lab, and the public key and signature algorithm are both ML-DSA-87

Step 4: Create the Issuing CA

Create the Issuing CA the same way, with its own token, profile and CRL settings, and with the Root CA as its signer.

4.1 Create a new CA

Go to CA Functions → Certification Authorities, enter PQC-IssuingCA-G1 in Add CA, and click Create….

4.2 Choose the token, algorithm and keys

FieldValue
CA TypeX509
Crypto TokenPQC-IssuingCA-Token
Signing AlgorithmML-DSA-87
defaultKeyissuingDefaultKey0001
certSignKeyissuingSignKey0001
keyEncryptKeyissuingDefaultKey0001
testKeytestKey
Alternative Signing AlgorithmLeave empty
Choose the token, algorithm and keys

4.3 Fill in the CA certificate data

FieldValue
Subject DNCN=PQC Issuing CA G1,O=PKI Lab
Signed ByPQC-RootCA-G1
Certificate ProfilePQC-IssuingCA-MLDSA87
Validity15y
LDAP DN orderClear Use
Fill in the CA certificate data

4.4 Set the CRL periods

FieldValue
CRL Expire Period3d
CRL Issue Interval1d
CRL Overlap Time0m
Delta CRL Period0m (default)
Generate CRL Upon RevocationTick
Set the CRL periods

4.5 Set the validation URLs

Fill in the three fields as in 3.5: click Generate for Default CRL Distribution Point and OCSP service Default URI, then build CA issuer Default URI from the CRL URL by changing cmd=crl to cmd=iecacert and adding &level=0. To use your organisation’s own endpoints instead, see the note in 3.5.

Set the validation URLs

4.6 Create the CA

Click Create. PQC-IssuingCA-G1 appears in the Certification Authorities list with the status Active:

PQC-IssuingCA-G1 appears in the Certification Authorities list with the status Active

Under CA Functions → CA Structure & CRLs, PQC-IssuingCA-G1 appears under PQC-RootCA-G1:

Under CA Functions → CA Structure & CRLs, PQC-IssuingCA-G1 appears under PQC-RootCA-G1

To view its certificate, go to CA Functions → CA Structure & CRLs and click View Certificate under PQC-IssuingCA-G1. The issuer is CN=PQC Root CA G1,O=PKI Lab, both algorithms are ML-DSA-87, Basic Constraints shows a path length of 0, and Authority Information Access holds the OCSP URL and the Root CA’s CA issuer URL:

The issuer is CN=PQC Root CA G1,O=PKI Lab, both algorithms are ML-DSA-87, Basic Constraints shows a path length of 0, and Authority Information Access holds the OCSP URL and the Root CA’s CA issuer URL

If CRL Distribution Points or Authority Information Access is missing, see T3 before you issue any certificates.

Step 5: Publish CRLs on a schedule

EJBCA issues CRLs on a schedule through a service. Add a CRL Updater service that checks both PQC CAs every 10 minutes and issues a new CRL whenever one is due:

  1. Go to System Functions → Services.
  2. In Add Service, enter PQC CRL Updater and click Add.
  3. Select the new service and click Edit Service.
  4. Fill in the form:
    • Select Worker: CRL Updater
    • CAs to Check: PQC-RootCA-G1 and PQC-IssuingCA-G1. Hold Ctrl to select both.
    • Select Interval: Periodical Interval, every 10 minutes
    • Select Action: No Action
    • Active: ticked
  5. Click Save.
Publish CRLs on a schedule
Publish CRLs on a schedule

Step 6: Issue an ML-DSA-87 TLS server certificate

6.1 Create the end entity profile

  1. In AdminWeb, go to RA Functions → End Entity Profiles.
  2. In Add Profile, enter PQC-TLSServer-EEP and click Add profile.
  3. Select PQC-TLSServer-EEP and click Edit End Entity Profile.
  4. Set these fields, and leave the rest as they are:
SectionFieldValue
(top of page)End Entity E-mailClear Use
Subject DN AttributesCN, Common nameRequired and Modifiable ticked (the default)
Subject DN AttributesO, OrganizationAdd it from the attribute list. Value PKI Lab, Required ticked, Modifiable cleared
Other Subject AttributesSubject Alternative NameAdd DNS Name, then tick Use entity CN field
Main Certificate DataDefault Certificate Profile, Available Certificate ProfilesPQC-TLSServer-MLDSA87
Main Certificate DataDefault CA, Available CAsPQC-IssuingCA-G1
Main Certificate DataDefault Token, Available TokensUser Generated
  1. Click Save.
Create the end entity profile
Create the end entity profile

6.2 Generate the server key and CSR

In the Ubuntu terminal, create the working folder, then generate an ML-DSA-87 key and a CSR in it:

mkdir -p ~/pqc-lab
cd ~/pqc-lab
openssl genpkey -algorithm ML-DSA-87 -out pqc-web.key
chmod 600 pqc-web.key
openssl req -new -key pqc-web.key -out pqc-web.csr \
-subj "/CN=pqc-web.ejbca-lab.test/O=PKI Lab" \
-addext "subjectAltName=DNS:pqc-web.ejbca-lab.test"

Run every terminal command from here on in ~/pqc-lab.

Print the CSR and copy all of it, including the BEGIN and END lines:

cat pqc-web.csr

6.3 Submit the CSR in RA Web

In the browser, open RA Web at https://ejbca-lab.test:8443/ejbca/ra/. It uses the same SuperAdmin certificate as AdminWeb.

  1. From the Enroll menu, choose Make New Request.
  2. Certificate Type: PQC-TLSServer-EEP. The certificate profile and CA are filled in automatically.
  3. Key-pair generation: Provided by user.
  4. Paste the whole CSR into the text box and click Upload CSR. RA Web shows the key algorithm as ML-DSA-87 and fills in the subject from the CSR:
RA Web shows the key algorithm as ML-DSA-87 and fills in the subject from the CSR
  1. Under Provide User Credentials, set Username to pqc-web.ejbca-lab.test. If RA Web also asks for an enrollment code, enter any value; you won’t need it again.
  2. Click Download PEM.
Submit the CSR in RA Web
  1. Copy the downloaded certificate from ~/Downloads to ~/pqc-lab, and rename it pqc-web.pem.

Step 7: Verify the PKI

Finally, verify the whole hierarchy: the CRLs in AdminWeb, then the chain, CRLs and OCSP with OpenSSL. Run the terminal commands in ~/pqc-lab, in the same terminal session, because later commands reuse variables from earlier ones.

7.1 Check the CRLs in AdminWeb

Go to CA Functions → CA Structure & CRLs. Under Latest CRL, PQC-RootCA-G1 and PQC-IssuingCA-G1 each list a CRL with its creation and expiry times. The Issuing CA’s CRL expires 3 days after it was created, and the Root CA’s 1 year after. If either CRL is missing or has expired, see T9.

7.2 Save both CA certificates

On the same page, click Download PEM file under PQC-RootCA-G1, then under PQC-IssuingCA-G1:

On the same page, click Download PEM file under PQC-RootCA-G1, then under PQC-IssuingCA-G1

Copy both files from ~/Downloads to ~/pqc-lab, and rename them root-ca.pem (Root CA) and issuing-ca.pem (Issuing CA).

7.3 Inspect the leaf certificate

Check the algorithms, the extensions configured in Step 2, and the size of the certificate:

openssl x509 -in pqc-web.pem -noout -text \
| grep -E 'Signature Algorithm|Public Key Algorithm' | sort -u
openssl x509 -in pqc-web.pem -noout -ext keyUsage,extendedKeyUsage,subjectAltName
openssl x509 -in pqc-web.pem -noout -ext crlDistributionPoints,authorityInfoAccess
openssl x509 -in pqc-web.pem -outform DER | wc -c

Expected:

  • Both algorithm lines read ML-DSA-87.
  • Key Usage is critical and shows Digital Signature only.
  • Extended Key Usage is TLS Web Server Authentication, and the SAN is DNS:pqc-web.ejbca-lab.test.
  • CRL Distribution Points holds the Issuing CA’s CRL URL, and Authority Information Access holds the OCSP and CA Issuers URLs from 4.5.
  • The DER certificate is more than 7,000 bytes, because ML-DSA-87 keys and signatures are much larger than RSA or ECDSA ones.
Inspect the leaf certificate

7.4 Verify the chain

Verify the leaf against the Root CA, with the Issuing CA as the intermediate, then again for TLS server use with this host name:

openssl verify -CAfile root-ca.pem -untrusted issuing-ca.pem pqc-web.pem
openssl verify -CAfile root-ca.pem -untrusted issuing-ca.pem \
-purpose sslserver -verify_hostname pqc-web.ejbca-lab.test pqc-web.pem

Expected: pqc-web.pem: OK twice.

Verify the chain

7.5 Check revocation with both CRLs

Download both CRLs from the URLs in the certificates, then verify the chain with CRL checks at every level:

ISSUING_CRL_URL=$(openssl x509 -in pqc-web.pem -noout -ext crlDistributionPoints \
| grep -o 'http[^[:space:]]*')
ROOT_CRL_URL=$(openssl x509 -in issuing-ca.pem -noout -ext crlDistributionPoints \
| grep -o 'http[^[:space:]]*')
curl -fsS "$ISSUING_CRL_URL" | openssl crl -inform DER -out issuing-ca.crl.pem
curl -fsS "$ROOT_CRL_URL" | openssl crl -inform DER -out root-ca.crl.pem
cat issuing-ca.crl.pem root-ca.crl.pem > crls.pem
openssl verify -crl_check_all -CAfile root-ca.pem -untrusted issuing-ca.pem \
-CRLfile crls.pem pqc-web.pem

Expected: pqc-web.pem: OK.

Check revocation with both CRLs

7.6 Check the Issuing CA over OCSP

Read the OCSP URL from the Issuing CA’s certificate and ask the responder about it. The Root CA signs this response:

OCSP_URL=$(openssl x509 -in issuing-ca.pem -noout -ocsp_uri)
echo "$OCSP_URL"
openssl ocsp -issuer root-ca.pem -cert issuing-ca.pem -url "$OCSP_URL" \
-CAfile root-ca.pem -verify_other root-ca.pem -resp_text 2>&1 \
| grep -E 'Signature Algorithm|Responder Id|Response verify|issuing-ca.pem:'

Expected:

  • The URL printed by echo ends in /ejbca/publicweb/status/ocsp.
  • Signature Algorithm: ML-DSA-87
  • Response verify OK
  • issuing-ca.pem: good
Check the Issuing CA over OCSP

7.7 Check the leaf over OCSP

Ask the responder about the leaf. The Issuing CA signs this response:

OCSP_URL=$(openssl x509 -in pqc-web.pem -noout -ocsp_uri)
openssl ocsp -issuer issuing-ca.pem -cert pqc-web.pem -url "$OCSP_URL" \
-CAfile root-ca.pem -verify_other issuing-ca.pem -resp_text 2>&1 \
| grep -E 'Signature Algorithm|Response verify|pqc-web.pem:'

Expected: Signature Algorithm: ML-DSA-87 (it may appear more than once, for the response and for the included signer certificate), Response verify OK and pqc-web.pem: good.

Check the leaf over OCSP

7.8 Revoke the leaf and check again

In RA Web, from the Search menu, choose Certificates and search for pqc-web. Open the certificate, choose Revoke, pick the reason Cessation of Operation, and confirm.

Revoke the leaf and check again

In the terminal, repeat the OCSP check, then fetch the new CRL and look for the leaf’s serial number:

openssl ocsp -issuer issuing-ca.pem -cert pqc-web.pem -url "$OCSP_URL" \
-CAfile root-ca.pem -verify_other issuing-ca.pem -resp_text 2>&1 \
| grep -E 'Response verify|pqc-web.pem:|Reason|Revocation Time'
openssl x509 -in pqc-web.pem -noout -serial
curl -fsS "$ISSUING_CRL_URL" | openssl crl -inform DER -out issuing-ca.crl.pem
openssl crl -in issuing-ca.crl.pem -noout -text | grep -A 3 'Revoked Certificates'
cat issuing-ca.crl.pem root-ca.crl.pem > crls.pem
openssl verify -crl_check_all -CAfile root-ca.pem -untrusted issuing-ca.pem \
-CRLfile crls.pem pqc-web.pem

Expected:

  • OCSP: Response verify OK, pqc-web.pem: revoked, a revocation time, and the reason cessationOfOperation.
  • The CRL’s Revoked Certificates list contains the same serial number that openssl x509 -serial printed.
  • openssl verify now fails with certificate revoked.
Revoke the leaf and check again

You’re done when

  • PQC-RootCA-G1 and PQC-IssuingCA-G1 are active, both sign with ML-DSA-87, and the Issuing CA chains to the Root CA.
  • The PQC CRL Updater service is active, and both CRLs download from their distribution points and verify.
  • OCSP returns ML-DSA-87-signed responses that OpenSSL verifies.
  • The leaf certificate verified as good, then showed as revoked in both the CRL and OCSP after you revoked it.

Troubleshooting

T1. ML-DSA-87 isn’t in the Signing Algorithm list (3.2, 4.2)

Cause: EJBCA offers only the algorithms that the selected crypto token’s keys support. Either the wrong token is selected, the token is inactive, or the ML-DSA-87 key wasn’t generated.

Fix: Open CA Functions → Crypto Tokens. Check that the token is active and lists an ML-DSA-87 signing key. If not, activate the token with its authentication code, or generate the missing key as in 1.1. Then go back to the Create CA page and select the token again.

T2. EJBCA warns that the CA has no encryption key (3.2, 4.2)

Cause: defaultKey or keyEncryptKey points at an ML-DSA key, or the token has no RSA key. ML-DSA can’t encrypt.

Fix: Generate the RSA 4096 key in the token if it’s missing (1.1, 1.2), then map defaultKey and keyEncryptKey to it.

T3. A certificate has no CRL Distribution Points or Authority Information Access (4.6, 7.3)

Cause: The certificate profile doesn’t use the “CA defined” values, or the issuing CA’s Default CA defined validation data is empty. For the Issuing CA certificate, that’s profile 2.2 and the Root CA’s URLs from 3.5. For the leaf, it’s profile 2.3 and the Issuing CA’s URLs from 4.5.

Fix: Correct the profile, and generate the URLs on the issuing CA’s Edit CA page. Then reissue the affected certificate. For the Issuing CA, open its Edit CA page and click Renew CA, keeping the current keys. For the leaf, repeat 6.2 and 6.3.

T4. RA Web rejects the CSR (6.3)

Cause: The CSR’s key algorithm isn’t in the certificate profile’s Available Key Algorithms, or the end entity profile points at a different certificate profile.

Fix: Confirm that openssl req -in pqc-web.csr -noout -text shows ML-DSA-87, that PQC-TLSServer-MLDSA87 allows only ML-DSA-87 (2.3), and that PQC-TLSServer-EEP uses that profile and PQC-IssuingCA-G1 (6.1).

T5. The leaf certificate shows Key Encipherment (7.3)

Cause: The profile still had Key encipherment selected when the certificate was issued. RFC 9881 doesn’t allow it on an ML-DSA certificate.

Fix: Clear it in PQC-TLSServer-MLDSA87 (2.3) and save. Then revoke the old leaf and issue a new one (6.2 and 6.3).

T6. OpenSSL doesn’t recognise ML-DSA (6.2, Step 7)

Symptom: OpenSSL reports an unknown algorithm or a signature verification failure.

Cause: OpenSSL is older than 3.5, usually because the commands ran on another computer.

Fix: Run the commands on the Ubuntu 26.04 server, where openssl version reports 3.5 or later.

T7. curl says Could not resolve host or Connection refused (7.5)

Cause: The CRL and OCSP URLs use ejbca-lab.test:8080. That name resolves only on the Ubuntu server, through the /etc/hosts entry from step 3.4 of the previous guide, and WildFly listens only on 127.0.0.1.

Fix: Run the command on the Ubuntu server. Check the name with getent hosts ejbca-lab.test, and WildFly with systemctl is-active wildfly.

T8. OCSP says Response Verify Failure, or the status is unknown (7.6, 7.7)

Cause: OpenSSL couldn’t find or trust the response signer, or the request named the wrong issuer.

Fix: -issuer must be the certificate of the CA that issued the certificate you’re checking. -verify_other must be the CA that signs the response, which is the same CA. -CAfile must be the Root CA. In 7.6, that means root-ca.pem for all three. In 7.7, it’s issuing-ca.pem for -issuer and -verify_other, and root-ca.pem for -CAfile. A status of unknown usually means the serial number isn’t one this CA issued.

T9. A CRL is missing or has expired, or the CRL number never changes (7.1)

Cause: The CRL Updater service is inactive or doesn’t include the CA, or the CA’s crypto token is inactive, so the CA can’t sign.

Fix: In System Functions → Services, edit PQC CRL Updater and check that both PQC CAs are selected and Active is ticked. In CA Functions → Crypto Tokens, make sure both PQC tokens are active. Then click Create CRL for each CA in CA Structure & CRLs to issue a fresh CRL straight away.

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Quick reference

TaskCommand
List CAssudo -u wildfly env JAVA_HOME=/usr/lib/jvm/java-21-openjdk-amd64 /opt/ejbca/bin/ejbca.sh ca listcas
Issue a CRL nowsudo -u wildfly env JAVA_HOME=/usr/lib/jvm/java-21-openjdk-amd64 /opt/ejbca/bin/ejbca.sh ca createcrl PQC-IssuingCA-G1
Generate an ML-DSA-87 keyopenssl genpkey -algorithm ML-DSA-87 -out server.key
Make a CSR from itopenssl req -new -key server.key -out server.csr -subj "/CN=…/O=PKI Lab" -addext "subjectAltName=DNS:…"
Show a certificate’s algorithmsopenssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text | grep -E 'Signature Algorithm|Public Key Algorithm'
Verify the chainopenssl verify -CAfile root-ca.pem -untrusted issuing-ca.pem cert.pem
Download and read a CRLcurl -fsS "$CRL_URL" | openssl crl -inform DER -noout -text
Check OCSPopenssl ocsp -issuer issuing-ca.pem -cert cert.pem -url "$OCSP_URL" -CAfile root-ca.pem -verify_other issuing-ca.pem

Run ejbca.sh as the wildfly user, as shown. As your own user, it fails with CLI could not contact EJBCA instance.

How Encryption Consulting can help

This guide gets an ML-DSA hierarchy working in a lab. Taking post-quantum PKI into production raises questions a lab can’t answer: which systems still depend on RSA and ECDSA, whether your applications and devices can validate ML-DSA certificates, how to protect post-quantum CA keys in an HSM, and how to move an existing hierarchy to new algorithms without breaking trust. Encryption Consulting helps with each of these.

  • PQC Advisory Services: We assess your quantum risk, build an inventory of the cryptography you use, and turn it into a prioritised migration roadmap aligned with NIST and CNSA 2.0 guidance.
  • CBOM Secure: Discover where RSA, ECDSA and other quantum-vulnerable algorithms are used across your certificates, keys and applications, and export the results as a CycloneDX cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM).
  • PKI Services: Our PKI architects design and implement CA hierarchies, write the Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS), and plan CA key migration, including running classical and post-quantum hierarchies side by side during the transition.
  • HSM Services: EJBCA Community Edition keeps ML-DSA keys in soft tokens. For production, we help you choose, deploy and integrate an HSM platform that generates and protects your post-quantum CA keys.
  • PKI-as-a-Service: If you’d rather not run your own CAs, our managed PKI supports ML-DSA certificate profiles and automated enrollment through ACME and EST.
  • PQC Center of Excellence: Try the PQC Playground, a hosted sandbox where you can stand up an ML-DSA Root CA and Issuing CA, then issue and validate quantum-safe certificates without building your own lab.

To plan your move to post-quantum PKI, contact us.

Conclusion

You now have a working two-tier post-quantum PKI on EJBCA Community 9.3. The Root CA and the Issuing CA both sign with ML-DSA-87, the CRL Updater service publishes CRLs for both, and the Issuing CA has issued an ML-DSA-87 TLS server certificate. OpenSSL verified the chain, both CRLs and the OCSP responses, then confirmed the revocation through both CRL and OCSP.

The lab also shows what changes with ML-DSA. A single ML-DSA-87 leaf certificate is more than 7,000 bytes, so expect larger TLS handshakes, CRLs and OCSP responses. Each CA still needs an RSA key for defaultKey and keyEncryptKey, because ML-DSA can only sign. And Community Edition keeps every key in a soft token, which is fine for testing but not for a production Root CA.

Before you use ML-DSA in production, test the clients that will rely on these certificates, because not every TLS library, browser or device accepts ML-DSA certificates yet. Keep the Root CA offline, protect CA keys in an HSM, and plan how your existing RSA and ECDSA hierarchies will migrate. A lab like this one is a low-risk place to find those gaps early.